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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are the landlord of a $1 million piece of property in
New Orleans, Louisiana. You rent the property out to a chemical
manufacturing company for $100,000 per year. The chemical company
begins experiencing financial difficulty, declares bankruptcy, and
terminates the lease. Upon arriving at the property, you realize that the
company’s recklessness extended beyond its financial practices to its
safety protocols. The company let dangerous chemicals seep into the
ground, and as a result, restoring the property will cost $2 million. In this
scenario, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) poses a threat to your financial wellbeing.
Section 502(b)(6) allows for recovery of one to three years’ worth of rent;
however, the provision could limit your ability to recover damages beyond
lost future rent.1
Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) sets a cap on landlords’
recoverable damages if the claim is for “damages resulting from the
termination of a lease of real property.”2 Although all courts that have
faced this question apply the cap to cancelled future rent payments, they
sharply disagree on whether to allow or cap non-rent damages such as
maintenance expenses—resulting in three different approaches.3 In the
hypothetical presented above, if the Supreme Court adopts an approach
using a broad interpretation of the § 502(b)(6) cap, you, as the landlord,
will be liable for the cleanup with a limited ability to recover against the
bankrupt debtor.4 If they adopt an approach using a narrow interpretation,
however, you could possibly recover some or all of the $2 million in
damages from the bankruptcy estate of the tenant depending on the
debtor’s financial position.5
The harshest reading of § 502(b)(6), from the landlord’s perspective,
limits a landlord’s recovery to only rent damages and caps the amount that
landlords can recover.6 A more moderate approach allows the landlord to
claim non-rent damages but subjects those non-rent damages to the cap

1. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
2. Id.
3. Michael St. Patrick Baxter, The Application of § 502(B)(6) to
Nontermination Lease Damages: To Cap or Not to Cap?, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
111, 112 (2009).
4. See Kuske v. McSheridan (In re McSheridan), 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1995).
5. See Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El
Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2007).
6. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 102.
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along with rent damages.7 The final, most lenient approach determines
which damages to cap by determining what responsibilities the tenant
would have if the tenant “assume[d] the lease rather than rejecting it.”8
Under this approach, landlords may claim both rent damages and non-rent
damages, and the cap only limits a landlord’s recovery of rent damages.9
The Supreme Court should adopt the final approach as promulgated in
In re El Toro for determining which damages to cap under § 502(b)(6).
Specifically, these courts should analyze whether “the landlord [would]
have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant [had] assume[d] the
lease rather than [terminating] it.”10 The El Toro approach is preferable
because it adheres to the plain meaning of § 502(b)(6)’s text, furthers
public policy goals by discouraging risky behavior and encouraging swift
remedial efforts, and leads to more equitable recovery.
Part I of this Comment will review pertinent bankruptcy law, lease
terminations, and their overlap. Part II will discuss the diverging
interpretations of § 502(b)(6)’s cap from other jurisdictions and the
arguments for each interpretation. Part III will review prior academic
literature arguing in favor of the El Toro approach. Part IV will add to
existing arguments in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s El Toro approach.
Specifically, it will argue why the Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth
Circuit’s test for determining damages based on canons of statutory
interpretation, public policy considerations, and fairness.
I. BANKRUPTCY, LEASING, AND THEIR INTERSECTION
For the § 502(b)(6) cap to be at issue, the case must center on
bankruptcy proceedings involving a lease termination.11 As such, an
overview of both topics is useful in understanding the issues present in the
interpretation of § 502(b)(6). This Part begins with an overview of
pertinent bankruptcy law, then discusses lease termination and its related
concepts, and finally, categorizes damage types in a manner conducive to
the § 502(b)(6) analysis.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See In re Mr. Gatti’s, Inc., 162 B.R. 1004, 1013 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981.
See id. at 982.
See id. at 981.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
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A. Bankruptcy Generally
When calculating how much a creditor, such as a landlord, can claim
in bankruptcy proceedings, courts follow a two-step approach.12 First,
courts analyze what claims a creditor has against the bankrupt party.13 The
bankruptcy notion of a “claim” is broader than the traditional definition of
a “claim.”14 Specifically, a bankruptcy claim is a “‘right to payment’ even
if that right is still contingent or unliquidated.”15 Creditors may file a proof
of claim during bankruptcy proceedings per 11 U.S.C. § 501.16 State law
or agreements between parties, such as leases, typically create these
claims.17
Next, courts identify pertinent limitations on these claims.18 Section
502 provides that claims are allowed unless a party in interest invokes one
of the applicable § 502(b) exceptions.19 For the instant analysis,
§ 502(b)(6) sets an upper limit on recovery for damages “resulting from
the termination of a lease of real property.”20 The calculation for the cap
adds one to three years’ worth of rent reserved for the remainder of the
lease to any unpaid rent due before the date of filing the petition or the
date that the lessee surrendered the property.21 Courts treat the amount that

12. Baxter, supra note 3, at 127.
13. Id.
14. David R. Kuney, Protecting the Landlord’s Rent Claim in Bankruptcy:
Letters of Credit and Other Issues, 29 NO. 6 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 17, 31 (2013).
15. Id. (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 501.
17. Baxter, supra note 3, at 161.
18. Id. at 127. The disagreement over whether the cap applies to limit a
creditor’s overall claim or specific claims that are then aggregated leads to
diverging interpretations of the § 502(b)(6) cap.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) provides:
[I]f such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the
termination of a lease of real property, such claim exceeds—
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater
of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining
term of such lease, following the earlier of—
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee
surrendered, the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration, on the
earlier of such dates.
21. Id.
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the landlord can recover as an unsecured claim.22 As such, landlords must
generally recover on a pro rata basis alongside other unsecured creditors.23
B. Section 502(b)(6), Termination, and the Importance of State Law in
Bankruptcy
Because the § 502(b)(6) cap limits claims “resulting from the
termination of a lease,” a precise understanding of the concept of
“termination” is necessary.24 The word “termination” in the Bankruptcy
Code maintains its standard meaning.25 It is “[t]he act of ending
something; extinguishment” or “[t]he end of something in time or
existence; conclusion or discontinuance.”26 There are two ways that a lease
can be terminated: (1) the lease may provide that it terminates after a set
period of time or (2) a party can affirmatively terminate the agreement by
taking actions that terminate the lease according to the lease agreement or
state law.27
The specific rules that apply to the termination of a lease are a matter
of state law.28 As such, state law dictates what circumstances authorize
parties to terminate a lease and the process of termination that triggers the
§ 502(b)(6) cap.29 In Louisiana, if a party fails to fulfill its obligations
under a lease contract, the other party may terminate the lease.30
Termination may also occur automatically.31 Specifically, if a landlord
uses abandoned property in a manner “contrary to the tenant’s rights,” then
the landlord has terminated the lease.32 Additionally, if a landlord breaches

22. Kuney, supra note 14, at 34.
23. Id. at 32.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
25. Baxter, supra note 3, at 117.
26. Termination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
27. Baxter, supra note 3, at 117.
28. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19
F.3d 1077, 1083 (5th Cir. 1994).
29. Kimberly S. Winick, Tenant Letters of Credit; Bankruptcy Issues for
Landlords and Their Lenders, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 733, 751 (2001).
30. LEOPOLD Z. SHER ET AL., REAL ESTATE LEASING: LOUISIANA, Practical
Law State Q&A 4567-5047 (2019) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2719 (2021))
[hereinafter SHER ET AL., REAL ESTATE LEASING]. Civil Code article 2719 mirrors
article 2013, which allows an obligee to dissolve contracts in general when the
obligor fails to perform. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2013 (2021).
31. Id. (citing Richard v. Broussard, 495 So. 2d 1291, 1293–95 (La. 1986)).
32. Id.
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the warranty of peaceful possession,33 courts have the power to find that
the landlord’s actions amounted to an effective termination of the lease.34
If a tenant defaults on a lease obligation, the landlord has two options:
terminating the lease or suing to enforce the lease.35 If the landlord
terminates the lease, he or she can recover for unpaid rent previously due
but surrenders the right to collect rent after the date of termination.36 The
landlord may terminate the lease either through a court-ordered dissolution
or, if the lease expressly allows, through notice to the tenant.37 However,
if the tenant’s default is based on a technicality, good faith error on the
part of the tenant, or substantial performance by the tenant, Louisiana
courts may choose not to enforce dissolution on equitable grounds under
the doctrine of judicial control.38 Alternatively, if the lease allows, the
landlord can sue to enforce the lease and recover for both past-due rent
and accelerated future rental payments.39

33. According to the Louisiana Civil Code, “[t]he lessor warrants the lessee’s
peaceful possession of the leased thing against any disturbance caused by a person
who asserts ownership, or right to possession of, or any other right in the thing.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2700 (2021).
34. SHER ET AL., REAL ESTATE LEASING, supra note 30 (citing Essen Dev. v.
Marr, 687 So. 2d 98, 99–100 (La. Ct. App. 1995)).
35. Id. (citing Richard, 495 So. 2d at 1293).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Edwards v. Standard Oil, 144 So. 430, 431 (La. 1932));
LEOPOLD Z. SHER ET AL., MANAGING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES:
LOUISIANA, Practical Law State Q&A 1-567-9056 (2019) (first citing Karno v.
Bourbon Burlesque Club, Inc., 931 So. 2d 1111 (La. Ct. App. 2006); and then
citing Ergon, Inc. v. W.L. Allen, Sr., 593 So. 2d 438 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
However, by terminating the lease, the landlord would surrender the right to
collect rent after the date of termination. SHER ET AL., REAL ESTATE LEASING,
supra note 30 (citing Richard, 495 So. 2d at 1293). However, including a
provision for stipulation of damages may help a landlord recover compensation
that is similar to future rent as long as it is reasonable and not an impermissible
attempt to collect future rent. Id. (citing Amacker v. Wedding, 363 So. 2d 223,
228 (La. Ct. App. 1978)).
39. SHER ET AL., REAL ESTATE LEASING, supra note 30 (citing Richard, 495
So. 2d at 1293). Louisiana law defines acceleration differently than § 502(b)(6).
In Louisiana, a landlord accelerates rent by “declaring the rent for the remainder
of the term immediately due.” Id.
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C. Termination vs. Breach vs. Rejection
Because the § 502(b)(6) cap applies to damages “resulting from the
termination” of leased property, understanding the difference between
termination and its related concepts is vital.40 The concept of termination
is related to the concept of breach in bankruptcy law.41 Bankruptcy law
maintains the common law definitions of both “breach” and
“termination.”42 Specifically, a breach is a “violation or infraction of a law
or obligation.”43 It is possible for a tenant to breach the lease without the
lease automatically terminating.44 The breach of an agreement by one
party may allow the other party to terminate the contract, but breach does
not necessarily result in termination.45 As such, breach and termination are
two distinct concepts in bankruptcy.
Likewise, the concept of termination is related to, but distinct from,
the concept of rejection.46 The Bankruptcy Code provides a trustee or
debtor in possession two options for unexpired leases: assume the lease or
do not assume the lease.47 Rejection is the decision to not assume the
lease.48 Assumption occurs when the bankruptcy court and the
debtor/representative of the bankruptcy estate agree to allow the
debtor/representative to perform its obligations for the remainder of the
lease as though it is a post-bankruptcy agreement.49 Rejection of a lease
constitutes a breach, but again, that breach does not necessarily terminate
the lease.50 Therefore, rejection and termination are distinct concepts, and
rejection does not inherently lead to a termination. However, rejection
does preclude the bankruptcy estate from maintaining the lease as a tenant.
D. The Three Categories of Damages
For the purpose of a § 502(b)(6) cap analysis, the potential damages a
landlord may recover can be divided into three categories based on their

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Baxter, supra note 3, at 116.
Id. at 117–21.
Id. at 117.
Id. (citing Breach, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117–21.
Id. at 118 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)).
Id.
Winick, supra note 29, at 755.
Baxter, supra note 3, at 118.
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relationship with the lease termination.51 The first category is “termination
damages,” whose existence “results from” the termination of a lease.52
Landlords have an obligation to mitigate damages that arise from
cancelled future rent,53 and doing so serves their best interests.54 However,
these mitigating actions create new costs like advertising and broker fees.55
These additional costs are termination damages.56 Specifically,
termination is the “but for” cause of these damages.57 In other words, had
it not been for the termination of the lease, the landlord would not have
incurred these additional expenses.58
The second category is “non-termination damages,” which do not
“result from” the termination of a lease.59 Termination, in other words,
does not cause the existence of these damages.60 In these circumstances,
the tenant would owe an obligation to the landlord regardless of whether
a party terminated the contract.61 In terms of “but for” causation, the
tenant’s obligation would still exist “but for” the termination. This
category includes, for example, physical damage to the property that the
tenant caused prior to terminating and would be required to repair either
contractually or under law.62
The final category is “unpaid rent due”63 before the earlier of “the date
of the filing of the petition; [or] the date on which such lessor repossessed,

51. Id. at 161.
52. Id. at 161–62.
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2700 (2021).
54. For a landlord trying to recover lost future rent from a bankrupt tenant,
the tenant will either not have the assets to pay the landlord or the landlord’s claim
will be capped by § 502(b)(6). Because full recovery is unlikely from the tenant,
a rational landlord would seek to recover by finding a new tenant.
55. Baxter, supra note 3, at 125.
56. Id.
57. For purposes of categorization, the Ninth Circuit’s test in El Toro
provides a clear standard for “but for” causation. Specifically, “[a]ssuming all
other conditions remain constant, would the landlord have the same claim against
the tenant if the tenant were to assume the lease [instead of terminating] it?” Id.
at 123 (refining the Ninth Circuit’s test from Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v.
El Toro Materials Co. (In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir.
2007)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 161.
60. Id. at 125.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 162.
63. Id. at 161 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6)).

2022]

COMMENT

571

or the lessee surrendered, the leased property.”64 Unpaid rent due before
the termination is similar to non-termination damages in that its existence
is not dependent upon termination of a lease.65 However, it is helpful to
break it into its own category because it is explicitly referenced in the cap
calculation of § 502(b)(6)(B).66 Unpaid rent due prior to the termination
of the lease is different from future rent that would have come due later in
the lease term. Future rent is universally considered to be a “but for” result
of termination and is therefore subject to the § 502(b)(6) cap.67
II. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING THE § 502(B)(6) CAP
Courts disagree to what extent § 502(b)(6) allows recovery for nontermination damages and have developed three approaches.68 As
previously stated, the Ninth Circuit initially adopted the harshest
application of § 502(b)(6) from the landlord’s perspective, limiting the
landlord’s claim to rent expenses and subjects that claim to the § 502(b)(6)
cap.69 Under this view, § 502(b)(6) precludes all other damage claims, so
non-termination damages, like property damage that predates the
termination, could not be recovered under any circumstances.70 The
middle view allows a landlord to claim all damages, including nontermination damages, but limits the entire claim to the § 502(b)(6) cap.71
Finally, the most lenient view, from the landlord’s perspective, permits a
landlord to make all claims, including for non-termination damages, such
as reimbursement for property damage that the tenant caused.72 Under this
approach, now embraced by the Eighth and Ninth circuits, courts apply the
cap to termination damages and future rent but not to the non-termination
damages or unpaid rent due.73

64. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6)(A).
65. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 162.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6)(B).
67. Baxter, supra note 3, at 144.
68. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38.
69. Id.; see Kuske v. McSheridan (In re McSheridan), 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1995).
70. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38; see also In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91.
71. Kuney, supra note 14, at 39; see also In re Mr. Gatti’s, Inc., 162 B.R.
1004, 1014 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
72. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38; see also Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church
v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 979 (9th
Cir. 2007).
73. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38; see In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 979;
Lariat Cos. v. Wigley (In re Wigley), 533 B.R. 267, 271 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).
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A. The McSheridan Approach
Courts that follow the Kuske v. McSheridan (In re McSheridan)
approach only permit recovery of “rent reserved” damages and subject
those damages to the § 502(b)(6) cap.74 In McSheridan, the lease was a
triple-net lease, meaning that the tenant was responsible for paying taxes,
maintenance and repair expenses, insurance premiums, and utilities.75 The
lease at issue specified that the tenant was responsible for paying for
repairs in a separate section rather than in the section titled “rent.”76 Rent
was up to date, and the tenant surrendered the leased property before the
trustee’s rejection of the lease.77 The landlord filed a claim for “repair and
maintenance damages, insurance, utilities, and other expenses incurred
after rejection.”78 The Ninth Circuit focused on the question of whether
“rent reserved” included expenses that the contract did not designate as
rent.79
In deciding the case, the McSheridan court adopted a two-step
approach that greatly limited a landlord’s opportunity to recover.80
Although McSheridan was subsequently overruled by the Ninth Circuit, it
helpfully illustrates the approach and its justifications, which is important
because other courts have relied on its reasoning.81 In the two stepapproach, the first hurdle that a landlord’s claim must clear is that it must
be a claim for “rent reserved.”82 For a claim to qualify as rent reserved, it
must satisfy three requirements.83 First, the lease must categorize the
payment as rent or additional rent, or the lease must specify that the
payment is the tenant’s obligation.84 Second, the payment for the
obligation must be related to the value of the leased premises.85 Finally,

74. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 102.
75. Id. at 94.
76. Id. at 95.
77. Baxter, supra note 3, at 154 (citing In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 95).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38 (referencing In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91).
81. See, e.g., In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., 368 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007);
New Valley Corp. v. Corp. Prop. Assocs. (In re New Valley Corp.), No. 98-982,
2000 WL 1251858, at *9–10 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2000).
82. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38.
83. In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 99–100.
84. Id.
85. For example, rent for a valuable piece of property is expected to be higher
than rent for a cheap piece of property. In this way, the payment of the obligation
is related to the value of the leased premise. Id.
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the payment must be a “fixed, regular or periodic charge.”86 Even if a claim
qualifies as rent reserved under the test, the Ninth Circuit created a second
hurdle for a landlord’s recovery: the recoverable amount for rent-reserved
claims is limited by the cap set in § 502(b)(6).87
As support for this test, the court decided not to distinguish between
damages occurring prior to termination and damages that are “caused” by
termination for two reasons.88 First, the court reasoned that Congress
tailored the statute’s focus to nonperformance of an obligation in the lease
rather than termination’s causation of the damage.89 Second, all of the
landlord’s damages are due to nonperformance, so distinguishing as to the
timing of nonperformance is irrelevant.90 In other words, this approach
ignores whether termination actually caused the injury and instead
analyzes whether the tenant failed to perform one of its obligations under
the lease.91
As support for these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit focused on the
purpose of the § 502(b)(6) cap in a number of ways.92 First, the court found
that the purposes of the cap were to balance the landlord’s interests against
other creditors’ interests and to prevent a windfall93 at the expense of the
other creditors.94 By narrowing possible claims to only those that are for
“rent reserved” and capping those damages, the McSheridan court limited
a landlord’s potential recovery and prevented windfalls.95 Second, the
court reasoned that because the rejection of a lease breaches every
provision in it, and because § 502(b)(6) limits a lessor’s damages resulting
from rejection, the cap should apply to the claim for rent-reserved
damages.96 Finally, the Ninth Circuit relied on the cap’s legislative history
by analyzing the prior version of the cap, § 63a(9) of the Bankruptcy Act
86. For example, paying for the privilege to use property on the first of every
month would satisfy this requirement as a periodic charge. Id.
87. Kuney, supra note 14, at 38 (referencing In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91).
88. In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 102.
89. Id.
90. Baxter, supra note 3, at 123 (citing In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91).
91. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 99–100. Critics of this argument
counter that this approach improperly ignores the phrase “resulting from” in
§ 502(b)(6). See id. at 123.
92. Id. at 102.
93. A windfall is “[a]n unanticipated benefit . . . not caused by the recipient.”
Windfall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
94. In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. at 97 (relying on In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc.,
166 B.R. 802, 808 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) and In re Atl. Container Corp., 133
B.R. 980, 985 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)).
95. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91.
96. Id. at 102.
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of 1898.97 The court found that Congress intended to limit the amount that
a landlord could claim for damages resulting from rejection.98 The Ninth
Circuit equated the terms “rejection” and “termination,” so it found that
Congress intended to limit claims that occurred by a tenant’s termination
as well.99
In sum, the McSheridan approach equates the terms “rejection” and
“termination,” treats § 502(b)(6) as “effectively synonymous” with the
prior version of the cap, and rejects the argument that the cap applies only
to claims arising after termination because it attributes all damages to
nonperformance.100 Courts that follow this approach allow tenants who
caused physical damage to the property to sidestep liability and pass it to
landlords by capping the landlord’s claim if the tenants terminate their
leases and file for bankruptcy.101 For non-landlord creditors, this approach
boosts the potential amount of their recovery by limiting the landlord’s
claim.102 Conversely, other approaches give landlords more protection at
the shared expense of the non-landlord creditors.
B. The Mr. Gatti’s Approach
Other courts allow a landlord to bring a wider variety of claims in
bankruptcy proceedings, but aggregate the claims and subject the sum to
the § 502(b)(6) cap.103 This is different from the McSheridan approach of
disallowing any non-rent-reserved claim and then capping those claims.104
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas’s opinion in In re
Mr. Gatti’s serves as the seminal case for this approach.105 Mr. Gatti’s
allows a broader array of claims, including non-termination claims, even
if the cap amount is the same.106
In Mr. Gatti’s, the tenant failed to maintain the premises and
abandoned the property.107 The contract obligated the tenant to pay rent on
a periodic basis, pay ad valorem taxes and utility expenses, and perform
97. Id. at 101.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 102.
100. Baxter, supra note 3, at 121 (first citing In re Mr. Gatti’s, Inc. 162 B.R. 1004,
1013 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); and then citing In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91).
101. Baxter, supra note 3, at 113.
102. Id.
103. See In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1014.
104. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91.
105. See In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. 1004.
106. See Kuney, supra note 14, at 38.
107. Baxter, supra note 3, at 149 (citing In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1007).
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maintenance and repairs.108 According to the agreement, if the landlord
terminated the lease upon the tenant’s default, the landlord could demand
damages and performance of any act that the tenant was obligated to do.109
It further specified that the landlord could recover for his own expense in
carrying out an obligation that the tenant failed to satisfy.110 At issue was
whether the § 502(b)(6) cap applied to repair damages in addition to other
damages.111
The court focused on the prior version of the cap, § 63a(9) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which limited “any damages resulting from the
rejection of the lease.”112 They analyzed whether the old provision’s use
of the term “rejection” was equivalent to “termination” in the new
provision.113 The court agreed with the tenant that the legislative history,
congressional intent, and past cases showed that the two terms were
equivalent for purposes of § 502(b)(6) and thus ruled to cap the landlord’s
entire claim rather than just the termination damage component.114 In other
words, the court limited the landlord’s piece of the pie that it could recover
from the pizza chain.
Although the Mr. Gatti’s approach differs from the McSheridan
approach, they share some similarities.115 Because the Mr. Gatti’s court
focused on the cap’s applicability to repair damages rather than whether
repair damages could be brought in the first place, the court illustrated that
it did not use the McSheridan approach of allowing only rent-reserved
claims.116 Similar to the McSheridan court, the Mr. Gatti’s court equated
rejection with termination and found that § 502(b)(6) was synonymous
with the previous version of the cap, which limited non-termination
damages.117 Additionally, both interpretations allow tenants who cause
physical property damage to sidestep liability by passing it off in

108. In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1006.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Baxter, supra note 3, at 149 (citing In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1007).
112. In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1008 (citing Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp.,
143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1009.
115. Compare In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1007 with Kuske v. McSheridan
(In re McSheridan), 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
116. See In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1007.
117. Id. at 1013.
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bankruptcy proceedings.118 The two are different in scope, but some courts
have relied on both Mr. Gatti’s and McSheridan in their decisions to limit
landlord recovery.119 The exact scope of the limitation that these courts
follow is not entirely clear, but the language of the cases seems to indicate
that they are more in line with the more lenient Mr. Gatti’s approach.120
Although the Mr. Gatti’s approach is more favorable to landlords than the
McSheridan approach, the Ninth Circuit produced the most landlordfriendly approach by distancing itself from McSheridan in El Toro.
C. The El Toro Approach
The final approach taken by courts is to allow landlords to bring claims
for all damages and apply the cap to “termination” damages and future
rent but not to “non-termination” damages.121 The major case in
developing this approach was Saddleback Valley Community Church v. El
Toro Materials Co. (In re El Toro Materials Co.).122 The case went to the
Ninth Circuit, which had previously decided McSheridan.123 In El Toro,
the tenant filed bankruptcy to avoid $23 million in liability for removing
tons of wet clay, equipment, and other materials.124 If the court applied the
§ 502(b)(6) cap to the removal damages, the landlord would have only
been able to recover $1 million.125 Instead, the court allowed the landlord
to bring its full claim in bankruptcy proceedings by adopting an approach
that focused on the following question: “Assuming all other conditions
remain constant, would the landlord have the same claim against the tenant
if the tenant were to assume the lease rather than rejecting it?”126 In doing
so, the court decided to reverse In re McSheridan “[t]o the extent that [it

118. See id. at 1007 (allowing tenants to avoid liability beyond the cap
amount); see also In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91 (allowing tenants to
categorically avoid liability for non-rent damages).
119. See In re New Valley Corp., No. 98-982, 2000 WL 1251858, at *9 (D.N.J.
Aug. 31, 2000); In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., 368 B.R. 383, 385 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
120. See In re New Valley, 2000 WL 1251858, at *9; In re Foamex Int’l, 368
B.R. at 385.
121. See Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El
Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
122. Baxter, supra note 3, at 158.
123. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d 978.
124. Id.
125. Baxter, supra note 3, at 158.
126. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981. Supporters of this test point out
that the test is correct, but the court erred by using the term “rejecting” where it
meant “terminating.” Baxter, supra note 3, at 159–60.
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limited] tort claims other than those based on lost rent . . . or other damages
directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete a lease term.”127
The court in El Toro relied on a number of arguments to reach its
conclusion.128 It read the statutory language of “resulting from” to require
“but for” causation.129 According to the court, the facts in the case showed
that the landlord’s claim for removal and repair damages would have
existed even if the tenant had assumed the lease instead of rejecting it, and
therefore the court allowed the landlord’s claim.130 The court further relied
on the language of § 502(b)(6) in reaching its decision by inferring that
because rental payment contributes to the determination of the cap amount,
the cap only limits recovery for loss of future rent.131 The court continued
by making a legislative intent argument, stating that capping nontermination claims would subvert the bankruptcy law goal of allowing
parties to recover for an “aliquot share of the estate” to provide
compensation to each creditor in proportion with what is owed.132 Finally,
the court made a policy argument by stating that allowing a tenant to cap
its liability would create an unsavory incentive “for tenants to reject their
lease” instead of assuming it or finishing the lease term.133 Additionally,
the court reasoned that under a broad application of the cap, tenants who
had filed for bankruptcy and had exceeded the cap but not yet rejected the
lease could cause more damage to the property without fear of liability.134
After El Toro, some courts, like the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio in In re Brown, adopted this approach.135 Conversely, the
Eighth Circuit in In re Wigley did not adopt the El Toro test explicitly but
focused its analysis on whether the landlord would “have the same claim
against the tenant if the lease had not been terminated.”136 Additionally,
some cases decided before El Toro seem to align with it by default as a
result of rejecting the Mr. Gatti’s and McSheridan approaches.137
However, since El Toro, commentators have disagreed over which
approach a majority of jurisdictions follow.138
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981–82.
See id. 980–81.
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id. at 981.
Id.
In re Brown, 398 B.R. 215, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
Lariat Cos. v. Wigley (In re Wigley), 533 B.R. 267, 271 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).
See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 229 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
Baxter, supra note 3, at 156 n.244.
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III. PRIOR DOCTRINAL SUPPORT FOR THE EL TORO APPROACH
Supporting arguments for the El Toro approach include in-depth
textual analysis of the phrase “resulting from the termination” and
legislative history.139 The textual analysis focuses on the use of the word
“termination” in other places in the Bankruptcy Code and the plain
meaning of the term “terminating.”140 The legislative history analysis
disputes arguments that the history of the cap supports a harsh reading of
§ 502(b)(6) by tracing the cap’s evolution, citing relevant case law, and
identifying the source of confusion between the terms “rejection” and
“termination.”141
A. Plain Meaning
For the plain meaning argument, it is necessary to recall the distinction
between the terms “breach,” “termination,” and “rejection.”142 First,
§ 365(h)(1)(A)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a tenant to treat a lease
as terminated when the rejection amounts to a breach that would entitle
the tenant to treat the “lease as terminated by virtue of its terms.”143 Thus,
the tenant may not terminate when the rejection does not amount to a
breach that would permit the tenant to treat the lease as terminated.144 The
non-mandatory relationship between the rejection and the subsequent
termination highlights the distinction between the terms.145 Second, in
2005, Congress added § 562(a), which calculates damages for breach from
the earlier of “the date of such rejection; or the date or dates of such
liquidation, termination, or acceleration.”146 By specifically referring to
“termination” and “rejection” in the same provision, Congress showed that
the two words were different.147 Finally, § 502(g) shows that termination
is one possible consequence of rejection.148 Therefore, rejection claims
include, but are not limited to, termination claims.149 Consequently,
termination can arise from rejection, but rejection cannot arise from
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 118.
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(i).
Baxter, supra note 3, at 119.
See generally id.
11 U.S.C. § 562(a).
See generally Baxter, supra note 3, at 119.
Id.
Id. (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)).
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termination.150 These three arguments show that “rejection” and
“termination” have different meanings in the Bankruptcy Code and are not
interchangeable.151 As a result, conflating the two terms, one of the central
features of the Mr. Gatti’s and McSheridan approaches, is conceptually
improper.152
Additionally, the plain meaning of the phrase “resulting from”
establishes a temporal and causative component that must be met for
§ 502(b)(6) to cap a particular damage.153 This supports the proposition
that § 502(b)(6) does not cap non-termination damages because, by
definition, termination does not cause these damages.154 For a
consequence to “result from” a cause, the consequence must follow the
cause in time; a consequence cannot precede its cause.155 Additionally, the
use of the phrase “result from” implies that the prior event caused the
consequence.156 Therefore, the phrase “resulting from the termination”
limits the cap “only to damages coming after and occurring because of
either party’s termination of the lease, whenever the termination
occurs.”157 As a result, the damages “resulting from” termination that
§ 502(b)(6) references can only occur after termination.158 These
“termination damages” arise out of and are caused by the termination.159
According to an interpretation of the plain meaning of the text, damages
that accrue prior to the termination cannot possibly be damages “resulting
from” the termination.160 Courts that follow the McSheridan and Mr.
Gatti’s approaches focus on nonperformance rather than timing and
improperly ignore the phrase “resulting from.”161
B. Legislative History
Scholars have also argued that the legislative history of the cap
supports the El Toro reading.162 Congress substantially changed

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. at 126.
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§ 502(b)(6) in 1978, but the legislative reports are incomplete.163 The cap’s
original enactment in the 1930s was more informative.164 The original
1930s cap did not focus on the size of a landlord’s claim.165 The 1933
version of the law focused on creating a new category of recoverable
damages for landlords rather than capping their possible recovery.166 As
such, that version of the law allowed future rent claims without any cap.167
In 1934, Congress limited claims for future rent to the equivalent of a oneto three-year period.168 The legislative history does not specify why it
chose to cap these rent claims.169 However, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. from that time suggests
that the changes were reactions to case law that sought to cover
prospective damages, like termination damages, rather than nonprospective or non-termination damages.170 Ultimately, the law capped a
landlord’s claim for “injury resulting from the rejection by the trustee of
an unexpired lease of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a
covenant contained in such lease.”171 In sum, the legislative history from
the 1934 changes suggests that Congress was not attempting to limit the
“previously uncapped, provable, accrued, noncontingent, easily liquidated
damages preceding bankruptcy.”172 In the following years, Congress made
small edits to the cap’s predecessor, but nothing in the legislative history
supports applying the cap to damages that accrue before the termination.173
In 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
proposed to cap a landlord’s claim “for damages resulting from the
termination of an unexpired lease of real property.”174 This proposal
recommended changing the provision from capping damages that resulted
from “rejection” to capping damages that resulted from “termination.”175
The Commission stated that it did not intend substantive change with its

163. Id.
164. Id. at 127.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 131.
167. Id. at 127.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 132.
170. See Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320, 332 (1934).
171. Baxter, supra note 3, at 136 (citing Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, sec. 4(a),
§ 63(a)(7), 48 Stat. 911, 923–24) (emphasis removed).
172. Id. at 137.
173. Id. at 140.
174. Id. at 141–42 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 Part II, at 100 (1973)).
175. Id. at 142.
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proposal.176 Some courts, like the Mr. Gatti’s court, understand the lack of
intent to substantively change the provision’s meaning to mean that
§ 502(b)(6) is “effectively synonymous” with the prior version of the
cap.177 These courts cap all damages, including those that accrued prior to
termination.178 However, critics argue that it appears that the legislative
history from 1932 to 1978 does not show any congressional intent to do
anything other than alter the common law rule to allow landlords to
recover a limited part of their future rents.179 Specifically, critics argue that
because the prior versions of the statute were meant to cap prospective
damages only, the revised language maintained that approach, and
Congress focused on limiting prospective claims by landlords, not claims
that accrued before bankruptcy proceedings.180 Although the previous
scholarship shows that both the plain language and legislative history
support the adoption of the El Toro approach, more legal support for the
El Toro test exists.
IV. HATS OFF TO EL TORO: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT A
SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF EL TORO
The existence of a circuit split on how to apply § 502(b)(6) illustrates
that the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue regarding the
interpretation of § 502(b)(6). Without an opinion creating a binding
interpretation of § 502(b)(6), lower courts lack a clear approach when
determining whether and how to apply the § 502(b)(6) cap to non-rent
damages. Given the split approaches by several circuits, the lack of clear
precedent creates harmful uncertainty at multiple levels. Specifically, such
ambiguity leads to uncertainty for lower courts, litigants, landlords,
tenants, and other creditors. Further, the existence of a circuit split across

176. Id.
177. Id. at 121.
178. Id. Baxter argues that the textual distinction between the old provision
and the new provision leaves non-termination damages uncapped. Id. at 122. This
emphasizes the importance of the textual argument that “resulting from” requires
a temporal and causative component for two reasons. First, the plain language
“resulting from” itself is direct support for reading § 502(b)(6) as not capping pretermination damages. Second, Baxter concludes that the meaning of the statute’s
plain language is so clear that the drafters intended to cap damages traceable to
premature termination and no other damages “arising under covenants whose
violation is not caused by termination.” Id. at 121–22.
179. Id. at 143 (citing In re Best Prods. Co., 229 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1998)).
180. Id.
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the country poses a problem even in circuits that have definitively adopted
one of the approaches, because the litigants involved in those cases run a
continued risk of the Supreme Court overturning the law that they follow.
The court in El Toro provided an overview of textual, policy, and
purposive arguments in favor of the cap, which scholars supplemented
with a more detailed analysis of the phrase “resulting from” and the
legislative history.181 The Supreme Court should adopt the El Toro
approach but modify the language of the test by replacing the term
“rejecting” with “terminating” to be more in line with the Bankruptcy
Code’s use of the terms.182 Specifically, courts should resolve the question
of whether to cap a specific damage by analyzing whether the tenant would
have been liable had he or she assumed the lease instead of terminating it.
In addition to the arguments set forth in El Toro and the other arguments
regarding plain meaning and legislative history, the El Toro approach
presents the best option because it is supported by canons of statutory
interpretation, leads to more equitable outcomes, and promotes public
policy goals by discouraging risky behavior and encouraging swift
remedial measures.
A. Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Canons of statutory interpretation applied to § 502(b)(6) bolster the
conclusion that the text of the statute supports the El Toro approach. First,
the preference for narrowly interpreting exceptions supports this test.
Additionally, the surplusage canon and the harmonious-reading canon
rebut a potential counterargument against the El Toro approach.183 These
arguments add to the prior textual analysis of the § 502(b)(6) cap that
focused more specifically on the plain meaning of the phrase “resulting
from the termination.”184
The El Toro approach to interpreting § 502(b)(6) is correct because it
follows the canon that exceptions to a general statutory rule should be
narrowly interpreted. Bankruptcy Code § 502(b) provides that “the
court . . . shall determine the amount of such claim . . . except to the extent
that” the following exceptions, including § 502(b)(6), apply.185 The
structure of § 502 and the plain language of § 502(b) show that the
181. See Baxter, supra note 3; Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro
Materials Co. (In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007).
182. Baxter, supra note 3, at 161.
183. See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)
(citing Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
184. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 163.
185. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
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§ 502(b)(6) cap is an exception to the general rule of allowing claims. For
statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has indicated its preference
that courts should interpret exceptions narrowly.186 Specifically, the
Supreme Court cautioned that lower courts should be especially wary of
extending an exception beyond its plain meaning.187 There are two ways
that courts can interpret the § 502(b)(6) cap: narrowly by following the El
Toro approach in not capping non-termination damage claims or broadly
by capping those claims, like the Mr. Gatti’s approach. Courts should
adopt the Ninth Circuit’s current interpretation of § 502(b)(6) because it
better aligns with the Supreme Court’s preferred method of narrowly
interpreting exceptions to a general rule. Because the plain language
reading of § 502(b) does not apply the cap to non-termination damages
and because the Court disfavors extending exceptions beyond their plain
language, courts should adopt the El Toro approach.
One possible counterargument to the El Toro approach is that
§ 502(b)(6)(B)’s inclusion of “unpaid rent” in the cap calculation
combined with the negative-implication canon limits a landlord’s recovery
for pre-termination claims to unpaid rent.188 The negative-implication
canon states that the expression or inclusion of one thing implies the
exclusion of others.189 In contrast, prior scholarly analysis emphasized the
plain meaning of the phrase “damages resulting from the termination” in
arguing for a narrow interpretation of the cap, like the El Toro approach.190
The analysis showed that this phrase limits the cap’s applicability to claims
that came after the termination and whose damages shared a causal link to
the termination.191 However, § 502(b)(6)(B) presents the basis for a
possible counterargument.192 The provision adds “any unpaid rent due”
186. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739 (citing Walling, 324 U.S. at 493) (“In construing
provisions . . . in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception,
we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation
of the provision.”).
187. Walling, 324 U.S. at 493 (“To extend an exemption to other than those
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative
process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”).
188. This counterargument was raised by Professor Louis Phillips in
discussions with the author. Specifically, the negative-implication canon states
that “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT
107 (2012).
189. Id.
190. Baxter, supra note 3, at 122.
191. Id.
192. This counterargument was raised by Professor Louis Phillips in
discussions on the topic.
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under the lease to the rent reserved by the lease from § 502(b)(6)(A).193 By
including unpaid rent from before the termination in the cap, critics could
argue that the cap applies to all damages that preexisted termination.
Unpaid rent from before termination, by definition, accrued prior to
termination. As such, it could not possess the temporal characteristic
necessary to be “resulting from the termination.” The inclusion of unpaid
rent in the cap calculation, therefore, causes tension with the plain meaning
interpretation of “resulting from” in the statute. If the authors of
§ 502(b)(6) felt that they needed to allow recovery for unpaid rent due
specifically, that implies that non-termination expenses are generally not
recoverable. Such an interpretation would lead the cap to apply to all nontermination damages and boost the recoverable amount by the unpaid rent.
There are two possible responses to this challenge that reconcile
§ 502(b)(6)(B)’s language and the adoption of the plain meaning of
“resulting from.”194 First, according to other canons of statutory
interpretation, § 502(b)(6)(B) should be read simply as a portion of the cap
calculation, and courts should not extrapolate it to contradict the plain
meaning of “resulting from.”195 The surplusage canon of interpretation
states that “[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given
effect. . . . None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it
to . . . have no consequence.”196 Reading § 502(b)(6)(B) in a way that
eliminates the temporal relationship between termination and “resulting
from” damages would cause the phrase “resulting from the termination”
to lose its effect.197 Therefore, the surplusage canon supports the El Toro
approach of limiting § 502(b)(6)(B)’s meaning to being part of the
calculation of the cap rather than changing the meaning of “resulting
from.”198
Second, the harmonious-reading canon states that “provisions of a text
should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not
contradictory.”199 This canon may seem inapplicable without first
determining what “resulting from” means. However, the ordinary193. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
194. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 188, at 174, 180.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 174.
197. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 158 (stating that the court in In re McSheridan
ignored the phrase “resulting from.”).
198. See generally Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co.
(In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the
focus should be on what claims the landlord would have if the tenant had not
terminated the lease).
199. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 188, at 180.
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meaning canon prevents this problem by specifying that “[w]ords are to
be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context
indicates that they bear a technical sense.”200 The verb “result” means for
something “[t]o arise as a consequence.”201 Applying the ordinarymeaning canon, it is evident that the phrase “resulting from” has a
temporal element.202 Therefore, to avoid a contradictory interpretation
between § 502(b)(6)(B) and the phrase “resulting from,” courts should
interpret the reference to unpaid rent as just a portion of the cap calculation
with no deeper meaning and not as a cryptic way of contradicting the plain
meaning of the phrase “resulting from.”
Courts can and should follow the harmonious-reading canon by
reading § 502(b)(6) as applying a cap only to rent and rent-related
expenses, as the court did in El Toro.203 The textual analysis, policy
considerations, and legislative history covered in El Toro and other
analyses bolster this conclusion.204 The extent of damage that a tenant
causes to property is weakly related to the amount of rent that a landlord
charges.205 To limit the recovery for property damage to an arbitrary
amount would be irrational.206 By specifically referencing “unpaid rent”
in § 502(b)(6)(B), Congress restricted § 502(b)(6)’s applicability to rent
and rent-related expenses.207 The El Toro approach is rational given that
rent and rent-related expenses are “the most obvious effect[s]” when a
tenant terminates a lease, so they were likely the expenses at the forefront
of the authors’ minds at the time of drafting.208
In sum, traditional canons of statutory interpretation add to the
preexisting textual support for adopting the El Toro approach when
applying the § 502(b)(6) cap. The arguments grow out of and bolster the
plain meaning of the phrase “resulting from the termination” and offer
support for El Toro. In addition to the textual support, fairness concerns
and policy goals weigh in favor of El Toro as well.

200. Id. at 69.
201. Result, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2000).
202. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 122.
203. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 982.
204. See generally id. at 978 (making policy and purposive arguments); Baxter,
supra note 3 (making textual arguments and legislative history arguments).
205. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 980.
206. Id. at 981.
207. See generally id. (adopting the interpretation of § 502(b)(6) that limited
the cap to just rent and rent-related expenses).
208. Baxter, supra note 3, at 125.
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B. More Equitable Outcomes
One focus of bankruptcy law is equitably distributing the scarce assets
of a debtor among creditors.209 The El Toro approach boosts equitability
through effects both before the bankruptcy process begins and during the
proceedings. First, adopting the El Toro approach can lead to increased
equitability, even before bankruptcy proceedings, by incentivizing tenants
to prevent property damage. Holding an entity liable for only its own fault
and not the fault of others is a fundamental component of the American
legal system.210 The narrow interpretation will financially motivate tenants
to be more cognizant of their actions, which will encourage them to
prevent damage.211 Preventing damage thereby prevents the need to repair
the damage.212 Tenants cannot use the § 502(b)(6) cap to pass liability for
property damage to the landlord if no claim for damage exists in the first
place.213 Therefore, by incentivizing a tenant to avoid damaging the
property, the narrow interpretation of the cap prevents shifting the burden
of repair to the landlord who did not cause the damage.214 Because fewer
landlords would make claims for repair damages under this approach, the
deterrence of damages also increases equitability to other creditors who
would not have their claims reduced by a landlord’s claim for repair
damages.215
Additionally, the narrow interpretation of the cap advanced by El Toro
bolsters equitability during the bankruptcy proceeding phase when the
landlord seeks non-termination damages in bankruptcy. It is first necessary
to recall the distinctions drawn between the categories of damages for lost
rent, both past due and future; claims incurred through mitigating lost rent;
209. Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits
of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80 (1995) (stating that bankruptcy is
focused on balancing allocative efficiency with equity and justice).
210. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2021).
211. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
212. See generally Damage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(explaining that damages are losses or injuries). Because there is no physical
property damage in this circumstance, there is no “injury” from property damage.
213. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 127.
214. See id.
215. Admittedly, these unsecured creditors would also not have their claims
reduced under a broad interpretation of the cap because the landlord’s repair
damage claim cannot be raised and would not dilute the recovery pool. However,
the analysis that the narrow interpretation of the cap discourages damage shows
that the difference in benefits to non-landlord creditors between the broad
interpretation of the cap and the narrow interpretation is not as large as it may first
seem.
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and claims for non-termination damages.216 Opponents of a narrow cap
argue that it would lead to a windfall for the landlord at the expense of
other creditors.217 However, each of these categories is for distinct and
separate damages that a landlord suffers, and allowing recovery for each
type of damage does not produce a windfall for the landlord.218 When
viewing the damages according to their source, it is clear that leaving nontermination damages uncapped does not lead to a windfall for landlords.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio’s decision in
In re Thompson exemplifies the flaws of the “windfall” critique.219 The
court, motivated by fairness concerns, prevented the landlord from
receiving “a substantial part of the property of the estate” because the
landlord could mitigate his damages by finding a new tenant.220 The court
continued its fairness analysis by reasoning that because the landlord had
received compensation through rent until bankruptcy and also would
reacquire the leased property upon bankruptcy, it would be unfair to allow
the landlord to recover for property damage at the expense of other
creditors.221
The court’s reasoning is flawed in its analysis of mitigated damages
and in its reference to getting the original property back. First, the
mitigation of damages analysis fails to recognize the distinction between
the future loss of rent damage and the “non-termination” damages, like
physical property damage that predated termination.222 These two
damages are distinct damages arising from different sources. By finding a
new tenant to pay rent, the landlord would mitigate the lost future rent
damage.223 However, finding a new tenant would not mitigate the physical
property damage.224 As such, the court relied on a flawed premise.
Second, in basing its decision on the fact that the landlord would get
the leased property back, the court ignored the fundamental characteristic
of these cases—reduced property value due to damage. Rent income and
216. See discussion supra Section I.D.
217. See In re Atl. Container Corp., 133 B.R. 980, 988 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)
(explaining that lease claims may prevent recovery by other unsecured creditors).
218. See Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El
Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2007).
219. In re Thompson, 116 B.R. 610, 613 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (citing In re
Rodman, 60 B.R. 334 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1986)).
220. Id.
221. Id. (citing In re Rodman, 60 B.R. 334).
222. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 162.
223. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 980.
224. In fact, finding a new tenant may necessitate repairs of physical property
damage. See Baxter, supra note 3, at 112.
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the extent of property damage are weakly correlated.225 Therefore, there is
no guarantee that past rental payments will cover the value of property
damages. In fact, if the cost to repair the property or clean pollution
exceeds the value of the property, the landlord could be receiving a net
liability back.
Third, the fact that a landlord’s claim may consume a “substantial part
of the property” is irrelevant. By invoking fairness as a quality, the court
begged the question of what “fair” means. Fairness is “[f]ree of bias or
prejudice.”226 The court’s conclusion that a landlord’s claim should be
capped because the claim would divert resources from other creditors is
biased against the landlord because of his or her status as a landlord or
biased against the claim for being large, over and above the statutory
basis.227 In other words, the court’s decision is unfair by definition. It is
fairer to leave the claim for property damage uncapped and then pay it
proportionally with the other unsecured creditors.228 Although it is true
that allowing a landlord’s uncapped claim for repair damages could reduce
the claims of other creditors, dilution of other claims is the very nature of
bankruptcy proceedings for scarce resources and could be stated about any
claim.229 As such, allowing the claim is fairer than capping it. 230
The situation in In re Bob’s Sea Ray Boats, Inc. illustrates the
unfairness of capping non-termination damages.231 In this case, the tenant
ended a commercial lease, failed to repair damage on the leased premises,
and breached a separate consulting agreement.232 The process of ending
the lease and leaving the property damaged is similar to the main series of
cases like El Toro, Mr. Gatti’s, and McSheridan; however, the separate
consulting agreement highlights the unfairness of the situation.233 In Bob’s
225. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 980.
226. Fair, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
227. Imagine a scenario with two creditors. One holds $80,000 worth of the
debtor’s debt while the other holds $20,000 worth of the debtor’s debt. Refusing
to allow the creditor who holds a larger portion of the debt to make his claim or
claims because that creditor would “consume a substantial portion of the debt” is
inherently unfair.
228. Order of Distribution in Bankruptcy, PRAC. L. PRAC. NOTE 7-383-1336.
229. Because unsecured creditors recover on a pro rata basis, the addition of
any claim without a corresponding increase in available assets necessarily
decreases the share of recovery. See Kuney, supra note 14, at 32.
230. Baxter, supra note 3, at 113.
231. See In re Bob’s Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 143 B.R. 229, 230 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1992).
232. Id.
233. Compare In re Bob’s Sea Ray Boats, 143 B.R. at 230, with Saddleback
Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co., (In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504
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Sea Ray Boats, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota
found that the consulting agreement was totally separate and not capped
by § 502(b)(6).234 Under the language of the statute, the consulting
agreement damages did not “result from” the termination of the lease
itself, as is the case with the non-termination damages, which the court
excluded from the § 502(b)(6) cap.235 The court’s approach in Bob’s Sea
Ray Boats supports the proposition that the analysis should distinguish
between distinct types of claims and not lump all of a landlord’s claims
together.236 This example makes a potential flaw in the Mr. Gatti’s
approach evident.237 If courts lump all claims together and then cap the
aggregate, like in Mr. Gatti’s, incorporating a consulting agreement into a
lease agreement would reduce the allowable claim for breach of the
consulting agreement, simply because it is part of a lease agreement,
through the triggering of the cap.238 Therefore, the Mr. Gatti’s approach is
absurd because it unnecessarily creates the possibility that a landlord’s
claim for damages under an incorporated non-lease portion of a lease
agreement would be capped as part of a lease claim.239
F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2007), In re Mr. Gatti’s, Inc., 162 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1994), and Kuske v. McSheridan (In re McSheridan), 184 B.R. 91, 102
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
234. In re Bob’s Sea Ray Boats, 143 B.R. at 232.
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
236. See In re Bob’s Sea Ray Boats, 143 B.R. at 230.
237. The court in Mr. Gatti’s referred to the issue before them as being
confined to whether damages “arising out of the lease agreement” are subject to
the cap but did not explicitly limit the scope of § 502(b)(6) to the lease agreement
during its analysis. See In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1007. The court instead
broadly concluded that § 502(b)(6) “limits a landlord’s claim” against the estate
once a debtor rejects the property. The use of the singular form of “claim” could
be read as a landlord’s overall claim comprised of an aggregate of smaller claims.
See id. at 1013. Even if Mr. Gatti’s is read to narrow the holding to only
obligations arising from a lease agreement, that distinction does not undermine
the illustration of the fundamental unfairness of the Mr. Gatti’s approach. This is
because the determination of whether a landlord should be able to recover for an
injury is better determined by what the claim for damage is rather than what
document created the obligation. See generally Baxter, supra note 3, at 127
(explaining the distinction between landlords and claims).
238. See generally In re Mr. Gatti’s, 162 B.R. at 1013 (ruling that the cap
applies “once a debtor rejects a previously unexpired lease”).
239. See generally Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co.
(In re El Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
an approach that allows tenants to terminate a lease and cap unrelated damages
would reduce operating value and deny the landlord’s recovery).
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Opponents of the El Toro approach may object to this argument by
claiming that Bob’s Sea Ray Boats is distinguishable. Bob’s Sea Ray Boats
focused on two separate contracts, the lease and the consulting agreement,
rather than a single contract with two separate duties, payment of rent and
repairing the damage, like in El Toro.240 This distinction, however, does
not create a substantive difference. Whether two duties originate from the
same contract does not vitiate the fairness concern, because the focus
should be on whether the injuries suffered by a party are distinct, rather
than whether the injuries suffered arose from the same document.241
Additionally, opponents could argue that landlords can adjust rent
prices to protect themselves from tenant damage and thus do not need the
narrow application of the cap from El Toro. However, landlords may
incorporate risk from the legal regime into their pricing whether the cap
applies to non-termination damages or not, so adjusting rent prices to
account for risk is not unique to a broad application of the cap.242
Conversely, applying the § 502(b)(6) cap broadly would uniquely push
rent prices higher because landlords would need to charge a risk-premium
for the possibility of a tenant passing on damages.243
C. Discouraging Risky Behavior and Encouraging Swift Remedial
Measures by Tenants in Furtherance of Public Policy
Narrowing the application of the cap would cause tenants who can
survive bankruptcy to reduce their risk-taking and the damage they cause
to the leased property.244 As a result, landlords, tenants, and society would
devote fewer resources to repairs, and liability for the repairs would be
less likely to reach the landlord or other creditors that were not responsible
for the damages. Even if this benefit does not alter the behavior of tenants

240. Compare In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d 978, with In re Bob’s Sea Ray
Boats, 143 B.R. at 230.
241. Baxter, supra note 3, at 127.
242. See Stephan A. Abraham, 5 Ways to Value a Real Estate Rental Property,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mortgages-real-estate/11/
how-to-value-real-estate-rental.asp [https://perma.cc/YB4K-2JT5] (last updated
Sept. 26, 2020) (explaining that the Capital Asset Pricing Model incorporates the
concept of rental risk to real estate investing).
243. See generally Adam Hayes, Risk Premium, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskpremium.asp [https://perma.cc/9NZ4-UNM8]
(last updated Feb. 19, 2020) (explaining that risk premium is the extra income that
investors require to accept additional risk).
244. See In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981.
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who will not survive bankruptcy, it is still an overall benefit because of its
positive effects on tenants who may survive bankruptcy.
Because the tenant would be less likely to escape liability by passing
it off to the landlord, the threat of liability will disincentivize the tenant
from damaging property.245 In jurisdictions that follow McSheridan and
Mr. Gatti’s broad interpretations of the cap, tenants have the ability to pass
repair damages to the landlord through bankruptcy and rejection.246
Conversely, jurisdictions that adopt the El Toro approach, which does not
limit a landlord’s claim for non-termination damages, either pass liability
to other unsecured creditors or keep it with the tenant.247 Whether the
liability for non-termination falls to the unsecured creditors or reverts back
to the tenant depends on the financial position of the tenant. Under the El
Toro approach, if the tenant will not survive bankruptcy, the cost of repair
liability falls to unsecured creditors and dilutes their claims.248 To prevent
this dilution of claims from occurring, courts could require tenants who
will survive bankruptcy to repair damages or compensate the landlord for
damage repairs.249
A narrow interpretation of the cap would encourage tenants that will
or may survive bankruptcy and tenants that would have survived
bankruptcy but for the damage liability to avoid unnecessarily risky
behavior because they would be liable for repairs. Deterring unreasonable
behavior is a key justification behind awarding damages.250 By eliminating
the risk of a tenant having to pay for damages caused through their own
fault, courts that follow McSheridan and Mr. Gatti’s reduce the deterrent
effect. Without the deterrent effect, tenants that plan on terminating the

245. See id.
246. Baxter, supra note 3, at 113.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. In re El Toro provides an example of an entity planning on surviving
bankruptcy. In the case, the tenant filed for bankruptcy to discharge its removal
of waste liability as a strategic move. This strategic use of bankruptcy proceedings
to discharge debt illustrates that companies can determine whether they will
survive bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 158 (referring to In re El Toro
Materials, 504 F.3d at 979). Admittedly, a tenant will not always know whether
it will survive bankruptcy; however, this line of reasoning extends to tenants who
know they will survive and tenants who may survive who would not want to be
stuck with liability if they do.
250. See generally Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 669 (La.
2008) (referring to deterrence of wrongful conduct by the tortfeasor as a purpose
of tort law and damages).
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lease and filing for bankruptcy would be less inclined to reduce risk and
care for the landlord’s property in a reasonable manner.251
Discouraging risky behavior is beneficial from a public policy
perspective and promotes fairness for the landlord and other unsecured
creditors. In United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., Judge Learned Hand
developed a cost-benefit analysis to determine what duty an actor has in
taking action or refraining from action, known as the Hand formula.252
Analysis of the § 502(b)(6) interpretations through the lens of the Hand
formula demonstrates the public policy benefits of adopting the El Toro
approach because it better aligns the tenant’s interests with the optimal
outcome from a general, societal perspective than the McSheridan and Mr.
Gatti’s approaches.
When using the Hand formula, courts weigh the impacts of the
expected damage from not acting in a certain manner against the cost of
implementing a preventative measure or refraining from action.253 The
approach determines the expected loss by multiplying the probability of
an injury by the “gravity of the resulting injury.”254 Courts set the value of
damage in a particular case from the objective perspective of society rather
than the subjective value to a specific party involved in the case.255 Courts
then compare the expected loss against the cost of preventing the injury.256
If the expected injury is greater than the cost of preventing the injury, the
party has a duty to prevent the injury.257 Similarly, a rational economic
actor may perform a personal cost-benefit analysis in deciding which
course of action to take.258 Because the El Toro approach does not limit a
tenant’s potential liability, a tenant’s potential liability for property
damage in jurisdictions that follow El Toro is unlimited.259 Like the El
Toro approach, analysis in the Hand formula does not have an arbitrary
251. In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981.
252. United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
253. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
254. Id. at 173.
255. Reasonableness is an objective standard rather than a subjective standard.
The Hand formula determines reasonableness by relying on the value of some
injury. Because the determination of reasonableness could not be objective if
comprised of subjective analysis, the value of the injury is determined objectively
rather than subjectively. See id.
256. Id. at 173.
257. Id.
258. Will Kenton, Cost-Benefit Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cost-benefitanalysis.asp
[https://perma.cc/2QZZ-AUZA].
259. See Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El
Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2007).
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cap on the possible “gravity of the resulting injury.”260 Conversely, the cap
on recoverable damages in McSheridan and Mr. Gatti’s limits the potential
cost to a tenant and can result in a tenant having no incentive to prevent or
repair damages that would be expected under the Hand formula.261 The El
Toro approach is preferable to the McSheridan and Mr. Gatti’s approaches
because it better aligns a tenant’s incentives with the societally optimal
course of action under the Hand formula.
McSheridan’s and Mr. Gatti’s broad reading of § 502(b)(6)—one that
prevents recovery for pre-termination damages—creates a mismatch
between society’s policy preference and an individual actor’s cost-benefit
analysis. Specifically, a business may perform its own cost-benefit
analysis and determine that the cap on non-termination damages causes its
expected loss from repairing property to exceed its expected loss from
refusing to repair the property.262 In such a circumstance, the company
would have no financial incentive to mitigate damages.263 Instead, it would
have a financial incentive to choose the cheapest means of achieving its
goals whether it be through improper disposal of pollution or insufficient
repairs.264
Because damage caps by their very nature limit an actor’s liability, the
Hand formula’s societal “gravity of the resulting injury” would be higher
than the entity’s potential injury.265 The probability of an injury to an entity
is equal in the tenant’s cost-benefit analysis and society’s cost-benefit
analysis because both probabilities refer to the same event—the
occurrence of damage to the property.266 This, combined with the fact that
the McSheridan and Mr. Gatti’s approaches limit a tenant’s potential
liability without limiting potential damages, causes these two approaches
to under-incentivize tenants to prevent and repair property damage.267

260. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
261. See In re Mr. Gatti’s, Inc., 162 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); see
Kuske v. McSheridan (In re McSheridan), 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
262. For example, the tenant in In re El Toro had its potential liability under
the cap as less than the cost of repairing the damage. See In re El Toro Materials,
504 F.3d at 979.
263. See Kenton, supra note 258.
264. See id.
265. See generally In re El Toro Materials, 504 F.3d at 981 (criticizing the cap
for creating a perverse incentive for a tenant by eliminating liability for damage
caused); see also Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
266. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
267. A simple cost-benefit multiplication formula from the tenant’s
perspective summarizes this conclusion. Relative to the optimal societal outcome,
the tenant would conduct the following computation: less potential financial harm
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Alternatively, the El Toro approach better aligns the tenant’s interests with
the societally desired outcome of how stringently to prevent property
damage because it aligns the tenant’s potential financial harm with the
overall damage to society.268 Because the likelihood of injury remains the
same and the possible harms to society and the individual tenant are more
aligned, the law will incentivize the tenant to pursue the best result for
society.269 Therefore, adopting the El Toro approach produces the best
public policy outcomes by incentivizing individual tenants to act in
accordance with the most favorable outcome under the Hand formula.
Because these claims focus on damage caused by the fault of the
tenant, the tenant is in the best position to prevent the damage. It is a
fundamental tenet of law that one should answer for his or her own fault
and not the fault of another.270 The El Toro interpretation of the cap
promotes this tenet by reducing the likelihood that insolvent tenants will
damage the property and pass liability to the landlord and by making
solvent tenants liable.271
In addition to discouraging tenants from causing damage, the El Toro
approach encourages tenants to take swift remedial measures in two ways.
First, leaving the claims uncapped would remove the financial incentive
to delay repairs in order to transfer liability to the landlord after
termination during bankruptcy proceedings.272 Like the Hand formula
analysis applied to preventing damages in the first place, the El Toro
approach better aligns a tenant’s incentive to prevent property damage and
repair property to the extent preferred by societal goals. Second, swift
remedial efforts can reduce the cost of repair.273 By leaving nontermination claims uncapped, courts will incentivize rational tenants that

X same possibility of triggering financial harm = less incentive to take action and
prevent the harm.
268. By refusing to cap non-termination damages, the El Toro approach
exposes tenants to a greater amount of liability for damages that they cause that
exceed the cap’s value.
269. See Kenton, supra note 258.
270. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2021).
271. See Saddleback Valley Cmty. Church v. El Toro Materials Co. (In re El
Toro Materials Co.), 504 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the other
approaches eliminate a tenant’s fear of liability).
272. See id.
273. See Stone v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 137 Wash. App. 1047 (2007)
(referencing expert testimony that early remedial efforts can completely prevent
mold after a water release).
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can survive bankruptcy to fix the damage early when it is less expensive
rather than waiting to let the damage and cost of repair grow.274
In determining how broadly to interpret the § 502(b)(6) cap, the
Supreme Court should follow the El Toro approach but correct the
terminology by replacing the term “rejecting” with the term
“terminating.”275 Specifically, these courts should analyze whether the
landlord would “have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant were
to assume the lease rather than rejecting it.”276 By doing this, courts will
properly allow for recovery of “non-termination” damages and leave that
recovery uncapped. In addition to the textual, historical, and policy support
for this approach covered by past courts and scholars, the El Toro test
presents a better approach to analyzing § 502(b)(6) than McSheridan, Mr.
Gatti’s, and their progeny because it comports with traditional canons of
statutory interpretation, leads to more equitable outcomes by altering
tenant risk and bankruptcy proceedings, and furthers public policy by
aligning tenants’ interests with overall societal interests.
CAPPING OFF
Without any further action by the Supreme Court, lower courts will
continue to decide cases without a uniform and specific standard. This will
simultaneously harm courts by reducing judicial efficiency in determining
which approach to use; parties, who will spend more in litigating the
disputes; landlords, who will bear the burden of increased uncertainty in
these cases; and even tenants generally if landlords raise costs to offset
their increased uncertainty. Although McSheridan and Mr. Gatti’s present
possible avenues for curing the uncertainty that exists currently, they
present negative side effects that reduce the benefit of having a specific
approach. In order to be faithful to the text of the statute, align with the
legislative intent revealed through historical analysis, consider fairness
concerns, and further societal policy goals, the Court should adopt the El
Toro approach.

274. See Kenton, supra note 258.
275. Baxter, supra note 3, at 161.
276. See generally id. at 123.

